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Comments
Witherspoon-Will the Due Process Clause
Further Regulate the Imposition of
the Death Penalty?
INTRODUCTION
In a society of ever increasing awareness of the importance of the
individual and his dignity, it is only natural that such a drastic sanc-
tion as the destruction of a human life should fall victim to the closest
scrutiny. Today, not only is the imposition of the death sentence
decreasing,' but so is its ultimate effectuation, due mainly to permis-
sive appeal procedures and executive clemency. 2 Furthermore, capital
cases are largely responsible for impeding the effective administration
of all other criminal cases because they consume a large portion of the
court's time,3 while the deterrent effect of the death penalty has been
found to be at least questionable.
4
With these developments, together with the growing public senti-
ment against capital punishment,5 fifteen states have abolished the
death sentence. 6 In this atmosphere, the Supreme Court of the United
1. The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, Report of the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (1967); Capital Punishment-Develop-
ments 1961-65, Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations, February,
1967.
2. The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, supra, at 143.
3. Id. at 39.
4. Supra note 2.
5. Elmo Roper and Associates, Release (February 9, 1958); Gallup Political Index,
Report No. 13 (June 1966); Louis Harris and Associates, Poll (July 1966). See also J. JoycE,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 265-66 (1961).
6. Thirty-five states retain the death penalty. ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 318 (1958); AMsZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-453 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2227, 43, 2153 (1947); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190 (West 1955); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-3 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-10
(1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 571 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04, 919.23 (1951); GA.
CODE ANN. § 26-1005 (1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 10-4004 (1947); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§§ 9-1(b), 1-7(c)(1) (1967); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-3401, 9-1819 (1956); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-403 (1964); KY. REV. STAT. § 435.010 (1963); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (1950);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (1957); MIss. CODE ANN. § 2217 (1942); MO. STAT. ANN.
§ 559.030 (1949); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 94-2505 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-401 (1943);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030 (1963); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 585:4 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN.
2A:113-4 (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-2 (1953); N.Y. PENAL CODE 1045 (McKinney
1944); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1953); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01 (Baldwin 1964);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 707 (1951); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1963); S.C. CODE
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States has been beseiged by arguments in favor of either the total
abolishment or at least increased regulation of the death penalty.7
The Supreme Court, however, ignored the clamor until only recently.
It is the purpose of this paper to explore three possible arguments
which, in the light of recent Supreme Court developments, Will
doubtlessly be pressed forth. Briefly, these arguments are: (1) that a
juror must be empaneled in the sentence determination of a capital
case regardless of the juror's view on capital punishment; (2) that those
who favor the death penalty are "prosecution prone" because they
possess highly dogmatic authoritarian personalities. This acceptance
would mean that the present composition of the jury determining the
guilt issue in a capital case, where all jurors favor the death sentence,
denies the defendant his right to impartiality, and his conviction
would be reversed. And, (3) that certain factual pre-requisites should
be established to act as condition precedents for the imposition of
the death sentence.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The Eighth Amendment was one of the first sources used for argu-
ing against the death penalty.8 It was proposed that capital punish-
ment was forbidden by the Eighth Amendment's proscription against
cruel and unusual punishmentf The United States Supreme Court
in 1879 unanimously rejected the proposition.1 ° By 1963 the Court's
position on the cruel and unusual punishment argument remained un-
changed; the Court felt that capital punishment was justified because
of its historical usage and its wide acceptance.11
It is interesting to observe that today the death penalty is no longer
widely accepted, as demonstrated by recent professional poll surveys.' 2
But in spite of the public sentiment against capital punishment, and
the position that the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning
ANN. § 16-52 (1962); S.D. CODE § 13.2012 (Supp. 1960); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2405 (1955);
TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1257 (1961); UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 76, § 76-30-4 (1953); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 2303 (1959); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.48.030 (1961); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 6-54 (1957).
7. See discussion, infra.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
9. See, e.g., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1889); Louisiana ex tel. Francis v. Resiveber,
329 U.S. 459 (1947).
10. Wilkerson v. Territory of Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879).
11. Jackson v. Dickerson, 325 F.2d 573 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 957 (1963). See,
e.g., Robinson v. State of California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 99 (1961); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 370 (1910).
12. Opinion polls, supra note 5.
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from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society,"' 13 the cruel and unusual punishment argument has
not found judicial favor.
1 4
Undaunted by the failure of the courts to accept the cruel and
unusual argument, the protestors of capital punishment regrouped
their intellectual stamina and turned toward the Equal Protection
Clause. 15 Noting that only some defendants in capital cases received
the death penalty, they maintained that this was a selective application
of the law in an unequal manner.'6 But this argument too met with
disapproval. The Supreme Court held that as long as all other persons
in the same class as the defendant are subject to the same punishment
there is no denial of Equal Protection of the Law.' 7 Nor is there a
denial of Equal Protection if only in capital cases veniremen are
selectively excluded from jury duty because of their views on the
death penalty.'"
The third constitutional argument directed against capital punish-
ment was found in the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of an impartial
jury.' 9 This argument first directs its attention to the procedure in
selecting a jury from the community. The selection process begins
with a group of veniremen who are selected from the community in
a random fashion and are then questioned in the voir dire examina-
tion. The purpose of the voir dire is to determine a prospective juror's
fitness for actual jury duty. If the trial judge finds that a venireman is
unfit,, he is challenged for cause-or, excused from jury duty. Pres-
ently,20 and at common law,2' there are four classifications into which
a prospective juror may fall: (1) propter honoris respectum, exempted
because of respect to his position, i.e. a lord, or congressman; (2)
propter defectum, exempted because of his failure to fulfill a necessary
13. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1967).
14. Id., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resiveber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
16. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 12, rehearing denied, 351 U.S. 958 (1958).
17. E.g., Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471 (1965); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353, 356-57 (1963).
18. E.g., Sain v. United States, 397 F.2d 799 (1968); People v. Carpenter, 13 Ill. App. 2d
470, 150 N.E.2d 100 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 88 (1958).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
20. See the present "Jury Qualification Questionnaire," AO-178 (Rev. 7-68) (temporary)
printed by the United States Government Printing Office which is used in federal courts.
21. 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 389, 361-64; M. Corru, ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 185-87 (1822).
We know little concerning the exact origins of our present jury system. E.g., J.
PROFFATT, TRIAL BY JURY § 2 (1877); Kun, Validity of the Unanimous Verdict Require-




qualification, i.e. citizenship; (3) propter delicturn, excluded because
of a felony or misdemeanor conviction and, (4) propter affectum,
excused because of a certain belief, bias or partiality maintained by
the venireman.
The impartial jury argument focused on the last challenge for cause
used against veniremen maintaining particular beliefs, and found its
way into the Supreme Court docket by 1820 in United States v. Car-
nell.22 In Carnell, a capital case, all veniremen who were Quakers were
challenged for cause because they did not beli eve in the death penalty.
On appeal to the Circuit Court, Mr. Justice Story decided that the
defendant's right to an impartial jury had not been denied and the
inclusion of such jurors would "corrupt the very sources of justice."2 3
The question finally reached the United States Supreme Court
2 4
where it was held that the practice of excluding veniremen who had
conscientious scruples against the death penalty was constitutional. 25
As a result most states continued to challenge a venireman for cause
if he did not believe in the death penalty.
2 6
22. 25 F. Cas. 650 (No. 14, 868) (C.C. R.I. 1820).
23. Id. at 656.
24. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
25. Id. at 298.
26. ALABAMA: Garrett v. State, 76 Ala. 18, 20-21 (1884); Logan v. State, 251 Ala. 441,
443, 37 So. 2d 753, 754-55 (1948); ALABAMA CODE, tit. 30, § 57 (1958). ARIZONA: State v.
Thomas, 78 Ariz. 52, 58, 275 P.2d 408, 412 (1954); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-219(A)(14)
(1956). ARKANSAS: Jones v. State, 58 Ark. 390, 397, 24 S.W. 1073, 1075 (1894); Williams
v. State, 186 Ark. 738, 739, 55 S.W.2d 928 (1933); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1920 (1947).
CALIFORNIA: People v. Tanner, 2 Cal. 257, 260 (1852); People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566,
575-76, 305, P.2d 1, 7 (1956), appeal dismissed, 358 U.S. 646 (1958); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1074 (West 1956). COLORADO: Demato v. People, 49 Colo. 147, 149, 111 P. 703, 704-05
(1910); Bell v. People, 431 P.2d 30, 31-32 (Colo. 1967). DELAWARE: State v. Windsor, 5
Del. 512, 513 (1851); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, § 3301 (1953). DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA:
Funk v United States, 16 App. D.C. 478, 488-89 (1900), cert. denied, 179 U.S. 683 (1900);
Turberville v. United States, 303 F.2d 411, 418-21 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S.
946 (1962). FLORIDA: Metzger v. State, 18 Fla. 481, 486 (1881); Piccott v. State, 116 So.
2d 626 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 293 (1960); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.20
(1944). GEORGIA: Williams v. State, 3 Ga. 453, 456-58 (1847); Massey v. State, 222 Ga.
143, 151, 149 S.E.2d 118, 124 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 36 (1966); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 59-806 (1965). IDAHO: State v. Wilson, 41 Idaho 616, 627-28, 243 P. 359, 361 (1925); State
v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 400-01, 253 P.2d 203, 206-07 (1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2020(9).
ILLINOIS: Gates v. People, 14 Ill. 432 (1853); People v. Hobbs, 35 Ill. 2d 263, 270-75,
220 N.E.2d 469, 473-75 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1024 (1967). INDIANA: Gross v. State,
2 Ind. 329 (1850); Perkins v. State, 207 Ind. 119, 122, 191 N.E. 136, 137 (1934); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 1504 (1956). KANSAS: State v. Latham, 190 Kan. 411, 431-32, 375 P.2d 788, 803-04
(1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 919 (1963); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1404, 1405 (1964). KEN-
TUCKY: Tarrence v. Commonwealth, 265 S.W.2d 40, 40 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 899
(1954); Carson v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.2d 85, 89 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 938
(1965). LOUISIANA: State v. Kennedy, 8 Robinson's 590, 594-95 (1845); State v. Jackson,
227 La. 642, 651, 80 So.2d 105, 107 (1955). MAINE: State v. Jewell, 33 Maine 583
(1851). MARYLAND: Corens v. State,. 185 Md. 561, 564, 45 A.2d 340, 343-44 (1945); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 51, 88 A. MASSACHUSETTS: Commonwealth v. Ladetto, 349 Mass. 237,
246-47, 207 N.E.2d 536, 542 (1965); MASS. GEN. LAW ch. 278, § 3 (1956). MISSISSIPPI: Spain
v. State, 59 Miss. 19, 22-24 (1881); Phenizee v. State, 180 Miss. 746, 750-55, 178 So. 579,
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The issue seemed settled until recent dicta revived the position
that a challenge for cause due to scruples against the death penalty
was inconsistent with the impartial jury concept. In Smith v. Texas 27
the Court said, "It is part of the established tradition in the use of
juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly
representative of the community. '" 2 In other decisions, it was observed
that the impartial jury concept would negate not only arbitrary class
exclusions based on race or color,29 but all exclusions that single out
any class of people,30 and that the jury is a body truly representative
of the communityl which must be a cross-section of that community.
32
And Mr. Justice Murphy, dissenting in Fay v. New York3 3 described
the jury as a
580-82 (1937). MISSOURI: State v. Miller, 156 Mo. 76, 84, 56 S.W. 907, 909 (1900); State
v. Odom, 369 S.W.2d 173, 183-84 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 993 (1964); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 546.130 (1953). MONTANA: State v. Won, 76 Mont. 509, 518, 248 P. 201, 203-04 (1926);
MONT. REV. CODES ANNS. § 95-1909 (1968 Supp.). NEBRASKA: St. Louis v. State, 8 Neb.
405, 412-13, 1 N.W. 371, 373-74 (1879); Rhea v. State, 63 Neb. 461, 469-74, 88 N.W. 789,
790-93 (1902); Nrz. REV. STAT. § 29-2006 (1964). NEVADA: Spillers v. State, 436 P.2d 18,
21-22 (1968); NEv. REV. STAT. § 175.105(9) (1959). NEW HAMPSHIRE: Pierce v. State, 13
N.H. 536, 556 (1943). NEW JERSEY: State v. Rios, 17 N.J. 572, 591-92, 112 A.2d 247,
256-57 (1955); State v. Reynolds, 43 N.J. 597, 602-03, 206 A.2d 750, 753 (1965). NEW
YORK: People v. Damon, 13 Wend. 351 (1835) (Sup. Ct.); People v. Fernandez, 301 N.Y.
302, 93 N.E.2d 859, 867-69 (1950), cert. denied, 340 US. 914 (1950); N.Y. CODE CRaM.
PROC. § 377 (1958). NORTH CAROLINA: State v. Bowman, 80 N.C. 432, 436-37 (1879);
State v. Childs, 269 N.C. 307, 317-20, 152 N.E.2d 414, 416 (1967). OHIO: Blair v. State, 5
Ohio C.C. 496, 504-05 (1891); State v. McClellan, 12 Ohio App. 2d 204, 232 N.E.2d 414,
416 (1967); OHto REV. CODE ANN. § 2934.25 (1954). OKLAHOMA: Smith v. State, 5 Okla.
Crim. 282, 283-85, 114 P. 350, 351 (1911); Application of Sharp, Okla. Cr. 414 P.2d 720,
722 (1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 660 (1937). OREGON: State v. Leland, 190 Ore.
598, 624-25, 227 P.2d 785, 796-97 (1951), aff'd., 343 US. 790 (1952). PENNSYLVANIA:
Commonwealth v. Lesher, 17 Serg & Rawles 155 (1827); Commonwealth v. Lopinson, 427
Pa. 284, 234 A.2d 552, 560 (1967). SOUTH CAROLINA: State v. James, 34 S.C. 49, 52, 12
S.E. 657, 658 (1890); State v. Robinson, 149 S.C. 439, 442-43, 147 S.E. 441, 442-43 (1929).
TENNESSEE: Cf. Long v. State, 187 Tenn. 139, 144-46, 213 S.W.2d 37, 40 (1948). TEXAS:
White v. State, 16 Texas 207, 218 (1856); Jordan v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. 217, 222, 226
S.W.2d 449, 452 (1950); TEXAS CODE CIM. PROC. art. 35.16 (1966). UTAH: State v. Condit,
101 Utah 558, 560-61, 125 P.2d 801, 802 (1942); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-30-19(9)(12) (1953).
VERMONT: State v. Ward, 39 Vt. 225, 231-33 (1867); State v. Shaw, 73 Vt. 149, 153, 50
A. 863, 864 (1901). VIRGINIA: Clore's Case, 49 Va. (8 Gratt.) 691, 694-95 (1851);
Hampton v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 531, 548-49, 58 S.E.2d 288, 294-95 (1950), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 989 (1950); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-210 (1960). WASHINGTON: State v.
Mahoney, 120 Wash. 633, 640, 208 P. 37, 40 (1922); State v. Leuch, 198 Wash. 331, 333,
88 P.2d 440, 441-42 (1939); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.49.050 (1961). WEST VIRGINIA: State
v. Greer, 22 W. VA. 800, 809 (1883), WISCONSIN: Spick v. State, 140 Wis. 104, 110-11,
121 N.W. 664, 667 (1909). WYOMING: State v. Aragon, 41 Wyo. 308, 316-17, 285 P. 803,
806 (1930).
Contra, IOWA: State v. Lee, 91 Iowa 499, 502-03, 60 N.W. 119 (1894). SOUTH DAKOTA:
State v. Carrington, 11 S.D. 178, 76 N.W. 326 (1898). But see, S.D. CODE § 34.3618
(Supp. 1960).
27. 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
28. Id. at 130.
29. Hogt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
30. Id. at 59 citing Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954).
31. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
32. Id. at 86.
33. 332 U.S. 261, 296 (1947).
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cross-section . . . includ[ing] persons with varying degrees of
training and intelligence and with varying economic and social
positions . . . .We can never measure accurately the prejudice
that results from the exclusion of certain types of qualified people
from a jury panel. Such prejudice is so subtle, so intangible,
that it escapes the ordinary methods of proof. It may be absent
in one case and present in another; it may gradually and silently
erode the jury system before it becomes evident.34
Through this dicta and other cases35 the revitalized impartial jury
argument was re-examined in Witherspoon v. Illinois,36 in which the
defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death
by a traditional unanimous jury verdict. According to Illinois jury
selection procedure3 7 all veniremen were challenged for cause if they
had conscientious scruples against the infliction of the death penalty.
The additional finding that the venireman could lay aside his scruples
to impose the death sentence was left unconsidered during the voir
dire.38 The Supreme Court of the United States readily narrowed the
issue to the constitutionality of this jury selection procedure which
excluded all scrupled veniremen (those opposed to the death penalty)
without determining whether or not they could lay aside their scruples
and impose the death penalty. 39
Turning to the Sixth Amendment the Court examined the right of
defendants to an "impartial jury" 40 in state procedures in which the
jury determines the sentence. 41 To be impartial in the sentence de-
termination the jury must "express the conscience of the community
on the ultimate question of life or death ' 42 and "maintain a link
between contemporary community values and the penal system-a
link without which the determination of punishment could hardly
34. Id. at 299.
35. See, e.g., Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363. 364 (1966); Turner v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 466, 471 (1965); Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 474
(1953); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946).
36. 88 S. Ct. 1770 (1968).
37. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-4(d) (1967) explained in People v. Hobbes, 35 Ill. 2d
263, 274, 220 N.E.2d 469, 475 (1968).
38. Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra.
39. Id. at 1773.
40. 88 S. Ct. at 1776 and also the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas at 1778.
41. Although a state is not required by the United States Constitution to have the
sentence determination considered by a jury, once such a procedure is adopted, the
Fourteenth Amendment demands that the Sixth Amendment "impartial jury" requisite
be observed by that state. E.g., Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966); Frady v. United
States, 348 F.2d 84, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 909 (1965). See Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 357 U.S. 12 (1956).
42. 88 S. Ct. 1770, 1775.
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reflect the 'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society.' ',43 With this concept of an impartial jury, sup-
ported by past cases, 44 the Court then considered available public
opinion polls on the death penalty, a source endorced by the American
Bar Association as representative of public opinion 45 but discouraged
by the Witherspoon dissent.
46
The statistics presented to the Court through Gallup 7 and others48
demonstrated that the Illinois procedure would exclude for cause
forty-two to forty-seven per cent of the population because of their
opposition to the death penalty. Consequently, the Court found that
the jury could not speak for the community because it was "culled of
all who harbor doubts about the wisdom of capital punishment-of all
who would be reluctant to pronounce the extreme penalty-such a
jury can speak only for a distinct and dwindling minority. '49 Limiting
the decision to condemned capital defendants the Court reversed only
the sentence determination of death as violative of due process, while
the conviction itself was affirmed.50 The Court, however, would still
permit a challenge for cause of those who would never inflict the
death penalty. 51 Two states,. however, have held that challenging a
juror for cause because he would never inflict the death penalty is
unacceptable and impermissible.5 2 .
Initially, it should be mentioned that in most capital. cases, if the
defendant is convicted, the same jury must then determine the proper
sentence. 53 Consequently, after having his sentence reversed, the pe-
43. Id. at 1774, n.15 quoting majority opinion of Chief justice Warren in Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1957).
44. See supra notes 27, 29, 31, 33 and 35.
45. ABA AnvisoRY COMM. ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, Project on Standards Relating
to Fair Trial and Free Press (1967).
46. 88 S. Ct. at 1783 (Mr. Justice Black, dissenting).
47. See supra note 5.
48. See Brief for the A.CL.U. as Amicus Curiae at 42, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 88 S.
Ct. 1770 (1968), and polls presented therein.
49. 88 S.Ct. at 1776.
50. This holding was applied retroactively to all capital cases where the unexecuted
defendant was sentenced by a jury composed solely of non-scrupled veniremen, 88 S.Ct.
at 1777, n.22, but not to defendants sentenced to life imprisonment by a non-scrupled
jury. Bumper v. Hall, 88 S.Ct. 1779 (1968).
51. "Unless a venireman states unambiguously that he would automatically vote against
the imposition of capital punishment no matter what the trial might reveal" he cannot
be challenged for cause. 88 S.Ct. at 1774, n.9. See generally Oberer, Does Disqualification
of Jurors for Scruples Against Capital Punishment Constitute Denial of Fair Trial on, the
Issue of Guilt?, 39 TEX. L. REV. 545 (1961).
52. South Dakota and Iowa are the only states holding this view. See State v.
Garrington, 11 S.D. 178, 179, 76 N.W. 326, 327 (1898), and State v. Lee, 91 Iowa 499, 60
N.W. 199 (1894).
53. This is the procedure in thirty-five states retaining the death penalty, supra note 6.
420
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titioner argued to reverse his conviction. In support of this motion,
psychological reports were presented indicating that jurors who favored
the death penalty were "prosecution prone" because they possessed
highly dogmatic authoritarian personalities. 54 This bias in favor of
the state, the petitioner maintained, denied his right to the consider-
ation of the guilt issue by an impartial jury. Although such a jury
was characterized as a "hanging jury," 55 "callous to suffering, '" and
"most likely not to recommend mercy," 57 the Court refused to reverse
the conviction. The primary reason for not reversing the guilt de-
termination by a jury that had no scruples against the death penalty
was based on the Court's view that current data on the subject was
inconclusive. Specifically, the Court stated that "we are not prepared
to announce a per se constitutional rule requiring the reversal of
every conviction returned by a jury" where all scrupled veniremen
were excluded.
58
THE THREE POSSIBLE RESULTS OF Witherspoon
The possibility of including scrupled veniremen as jurors in the PEN-
ALTY determination of a capital case
The Witherspoon analysis catagorizes veniremen into four groups
based on their feelings about capital punishment. These are: (A)
non-scrupled veniremen-those who are in favor of only death if the
defendant is found guilty59 (hereinafter referred to as Group A); (B)
54. Brief for the A.C.L.U. as Amicus Curiae at 37, Witherspoon v. State of Illinois, 88
S.Ct. 1770 (1968), citing C. Wilson, Belief in Capital Punishment and Jury Performance,
1964 (unpublished, University of Texas); Brief of Rebecca B. Madden as Amicus Curiae
at 35, summarizing Robert F. Crosson, An Investigation into Certain Personality Variables
Among Capital Trial Jurors, 1966 (unpublished, Western Reserve University); Brief for
Petitioner at 31, discussing study of Faye J. Goldberg, Attitude Toward Capital Punish-
ment and Behavior as a Juror in Simulated Capital Cases, undated (unpublished,
Morehouse College).
Mr. Justice Douglas, however, accepts the "prosecution prone"- concept and consequently
would also reverse the conviction. 88 S. Ct. at 1781. See Oberer, supra note 50.
55. 88 S. Ct. at 1778.
56. "The implication of the majority opinion is .. . that people who do not have
conscientious scruples against the death penalty are somehow callous to suffering. and ...
'prosecution prone'." 88 S.Ct. at 1785, Mr. Justice Black dissenting.
57. 88 S.Ct. at 1781, Mr. Justice Douglas concurring.
58. 88 S.Ct. at 1775.
59. I would not dream of foisting on a criminal defendant a juror who admitted
that he had conscientious or religious scruples against not inflicting the death
sentence on any person convicted of murder (a juror who claims, for example, that
he adheres literally to the Biblical admonition of "an eye for an eye"). Yet the logical
result of the majority's holding is that such persons must be allowed so that the
"conscience of the community" will be fully represented.
88 S.Ct at 1784, Mr. Justice Black dissenting.
421
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non-scrupled veniremen-those who would also consider life imprison-
ment 0 (hereinafter, Group B); (C) scrupled veniremen-those who
could lay aside their feelings and impose the death sentence0 ' (herein-
after, Group C); (D) scrupled veniremen-those who would never
impose the death penalty6 2 (hereinafter, Group D). Prior to Wither-
spoon, the Illinois procedure challenged for cause Groups C and D;
after the Witherspoon determination, Group C could no longer be
challenged for cause without violating the Sixth Amendment. Group
D, however, still could be constitutionally challenged for cause be-
cause they could not "consider all of the penalties provided by law
'6 3
and they were "irrevocably committed, before . . . trial .... to vote
against the penalty of death. 64 It is obvious, however, that those who
would only select death as a sentence (Group A) in a capital case would
also be incapable of "consider[ing] all of the penalties provided by
law" because they would never consider a life sentence. But this
incapacity was left unrecognized in the Court's opinion.
One reason for the continuing exclusion of Group D may rest in
the depth of data available at the time of the Witherspoon decision.
Gallup Polls and others65 only indicated that forty-two to forty-seven
percent of the adult U.S. population opposed capital punishment
(Groups C and D combined). But the forty-two to forty-seven percent
has never been broken down to demonstrate the difference between
Group C, those who could lay aside their opposition to the death
penalty and sentence a man to death, and Group D, those who would
never sentence a man to death. 6 The majority in Witherspoon, how-
The inclusion of this group is also recognized elsewhere. In Collins v. People, 194 I11.
506, 519, 62 N.E. 902, 905 (1902) the court stated that if a juror believed "that a man
who would shoot his wife without cause should be strung up is not a disqualifying con-
dition of mind .... Good citizens do and should condemn crime, and should favor the
infliction of severe punishment upon the man who kills his wife without cause." And in
State v. Jefferson, 131 N.J.L. 70, 71, 34 A.2d 881, 882 (1943), a venireman could not be
challenged because he believed "that everyone convicted of murder in the first degree
should suffer the death penalty," in the absence of any malice or ill will. See Spencer v.
Beto, 398 F.2d 500 (1968), cert. denied, 37 U.S.L.W. 3308 (U.S. Mar. 1969) (No. -).
See also N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:78-4, 2A:113-4 (1952).
60. Recognizing that not all non-scrupled jurors fall within Group A described in note
54, supra, the conclusion that some non-scrupled jurors can "consider all of the penalties
provided by law" is logically inferred. 88 S. Ct. at 1777.
61. Concerning the scrupled juror (Group C), the court held "that a sentence of
death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen
by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the
death penalty or expressed conscientious scruples against its infliction," 88 S. Ct. at 1777.
62. Id. at 1777, n.21.
63. Id. at 1777.
64. Id.
65. Supra note 5.
66. The Witherspoon case, decided on June 3, 1968, gave no specific indication that
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ever, found that the exclusion of Group C from jury service consti-
tuted a significant portion of those opposed to capital punishment
6 7
while the dissent assumed that members of Group C were insignifi-
cant.68 Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, felt that the inclusion of Group
C "is based on a semantic illusion and . . . the practical effect ... will
not produce a significantly different kind of jury from the one chosen
in this case." 69 To assist the resolution of this conflict which affected
the basis of both the majority and dissenting opinions, a survey of
TABLE I. Findings of the Duquesne Capital Punishment Opinion Poll
N = 188
45.8% had no scruples against capital
punishment (Groups A and B).
54.2% had scruples against capital
punishment (Groups C and D).
100.0%
9.6% would impose death in all cases
(Group A).
36.2% favored death, but would con-
sider life (Group B).
33.0% opposed death, but would con-
sider it (Group C).
21.2% opposed death in all cases
(Group D).
100.0%
188 university students was taken in November, 1968, at Duquesne
University to determine the relative sizes of Groups A, B, C, and D.
The students in the sample consisted of the following sub-samples:
14 in the Law School, 23 in Philosophy, 26 in Sociology, 55 in the
Business Night School, and 70 in the Business Day School. The
questionnaire answered by the students is reproduced in the Ap-
the following Gallup Poll of 1504 adults reported in February of 1968 was considered.
GALLUP POLL USING "SCRUPLE" CATEGORIES
N = 1504
34% have scruples
65% have no scruples
1% don't know
100%
[Group C = 13%]
of those who have scruples
18% would never vote for death.
[Group D in Witherspoon]
7% only in the most terrible cases.




67. The exclusion of Group C "crossed the line of neutrality" in favor of the prosecu-
tion. 88 S. Ct. at 1776.
68. Id. at 1786.
69. Id.
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pendix, infra. Table I., above, indicates the breakdown of responses
to item 41 of the questionnaire.
The validity of these figures is supported by similar findings in a
1965-66 Gallup Survey of 621 college students in which:
TABLE If. Gallup Survey of College Students, 1965-6670
N = 621
45.5% favored capital punishment (Groups A and B), and
54.5% were opposed (Groups C and D).
100.0%
Furthermore, it is informative to observe the similarity of the voir
dire examination of veniremen in Witherspoon itself:
TABLE Ill. The Witherspoon Findings71
N = 143
51% had no scruples against capital punishment
(Groups A and B), while
49% had scruples, and were excused for cause
(Groups C and D).
Historically, the Supreme Court has invalidated jury selection pro-
cedures devised to exclude veniremen based solely on physical charac-
teristics, i.e., Negroes,72 women 3 or on economic status, i.e., wage
earners.74 Exclusions based on legally permissible beliefs5 have also
been abolished on the state supreme court level and now in the
United States Supreme Court through Witherspoon. If the results of
the Duquesne Survey that the legally permissible belief of Group D is
maintained by almost one-half of the scrupled population are con-
firmed by larger professional public opinion services, such as Gallup,
the issue concerning the continuing exclusion of Group D from jury
service will swiftly rise again. The Court will then be faced with the
issue of whether or not the systematic exclusion of those who would
never inflict the death penalty is unconstitutional.
70. Reported in H. ZEISEL, SOME DATA ON JUROR ATTITUDES TOWARD CAPITAL PUNISH-
NIENT 17 (Center for Studies in Crisninal Justice, University of Chicago Law School, 1968).
71. Brief for Petitioner at 5.
72. Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1967).
73. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1947).
74. Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958).
75. Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965) (exclusion of atheists im-
proper); Juarez v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 297, 277 S.W. 1091 (1925) (exclusion of members
of the Catholic faith improper).
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D C B A
Witherspoon Position
D always opposed to the death sentence.
C opposed, but would consider the death
sentence.
B in favor of the death sentence, but
would consider life imprisornment.
A would always impose the death sentence.
FIGURE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF THE DUQUESNE SAMPLE REGARDING THE FOUR Witherspoon
POSITIONS ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. (N = 188)
The core of the proposed contest to include Group D consists in
the definition of a constitutional impartial jury. The majority in
Witherspoon views an impartial jury as a true "cross-section of the
community,"' 76  "a body truly representative of the community,
' 77
and a group which "reasonably reflects a cross-section of the popula-
tion. 17 8 Furthermore, the rationale reaffirms the holding of Glasser
76. Fay v. People of State of New York, supra at 296.
77. Smith v. Texas, supra at 130.
78. Brown v. Allen, supra at 474.
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v. United States79 discouraging any tendency in selection which might
result in a jury slightly less than representative of the population.
80
The logical conclusion to this line of reasoning would require a jury
to be composed of a statistical cross-section which would include
Group D. But this does not square with the holding in Witherspoon
which excluded Group D from considering the sentence in a capital
case. For although the language infers a random type sample of the
entire community, :the Witherspoon holding still excuses Group D
for cause. Furthermore, the Court made no mention of the existing
practice of challenging a venireman for cause based on (1) exemption,
i.e. congressmen, (2) disqualification, i.e. aliens, (3) exclusion, i.e.
felons, (4) excuse, i.e. bias or partiality.81 Consequently a constitu-
tional "cross-section" is not synonymous with a statistical "cross-sec-
tion," and, this fact is recognized by both the concurring82 and
dissenting opinions 3
The dissent would narrow the selection of an impartial jury even
further, however, by maintaining that not only should Group D be
excused for cause, but Group C should also be subtracted. The result
is, according to both the majority and the dissent, that a "cross-section"
can only be drawn from a particular segment of American society.
For the majority, if the Duquesne Poll results are confirmed, this
segment constitutes 78.8 percent of the adult U.S. population and less
if other challenges for cause are included; a result at odds with the
literal definition of an impartial jury. For the dissent, the portion of
the community from which to draw an impartial jury withers to
4284 or 45.8 percent, 5 which is even more paradoxical.
Not only is the exclusion of Group D by the majority incompatible
with its rationale, observes Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring, but it
also "results in weeding out those members of the community most
likely to recommend mercy and to leave in those most likely not to
recommend mercy."816 The result being a jury disproportionately com-
prised of the extremists of society.
87
79. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
80. Id. at 89. See also Hopkins v. Nashville, C. and St. L. Ry., 96 Tenn. 409, 34 S.W.
1029 (1869).
81. See discussion supra.
82. 88 s. Ct. at 1778.
83. Id. at 1784.
84. Gallup Political Index, supra note 5.
85. Duquesne Poll, Table I, supra.
86. 88 S. Ct. 1778, 1781, Mr. Justice Douglas concurring.
87. Id. See Oberer, supra note 51.
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It is suggested that the primary reason for the majority limitation
of jury service to 78.8 percent of the population was due to the lack
of sufficiently detailed statistical data. Once the relative size of Group
D is finally determined and reckoned with, it is predictable that the
Court should find that excluding Group D results in the "wholesale
exclusion of a class that makes up a substantial portion of the popula-
tion produc[ing] an unrepresentative jury. ' 8 8 This prediction is
strengthened when the Court's decision holding the size of Group C
as significant, is considered together with the size of Group D as
indicated by the Duquesne Poll. If the Duquesne Poll results are
confirmed, it is dubious that 21.8 percent of the population (Group
D) would be considered insignificant, when the Court in Witherspoon
has already found that Group C, making up 33.0 percent of the society,
was significant.
Broadening the impartial jury concept to include Group D would
also render any examination during voir dire concerning the venire-
man's scruples on the death penalty irrelevant, since scruples would
no longer be a basis for a challenge for cause. The trial court in its
discretion, however, may permit scruple examinations for the purpose
of a pre-emptory challenge.
The possibility of including all scrupled veniremen as jurors in the
GUILT determination of a capital case
While the sentence determination by a non-scrupled jury in Wither-
spoon was reversed, the conviction or guilt determination by the
non-scrupled jury was affirmed. This distinction stemmed from the
Court's consideration of psychological data89 which demonstrated that
those favoring capital punishment were biased in favor of the prose-
cution, or "prosecution prone," 90 because they possessed highly dog-
matic authoritarian personalities.
The defendant argued: (1) that jurors determining the guilt issue
favored the death penalty; (2) that those who favored the death penalty
were highly dogmatic individuals; (3) that highly dogmatic jurors
were prosecution prone. From the above premises the defendant
88. 88 S. Ct. at 1782.
89. Supra note 54.
90. 88 S. Ct. at 1782. Other studies supported the petitioner's position, but they were
not directly discussed by the Court. See T. ADORNO, THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY 175-78
(1950); V. Boehm, Mr. Prejudice, Miss Sympathy, and the Authoritarian Personality: An
Application of Psychological Measuring Techniques to the Problems of Jury Bias, 68
Wisc. L. REv. 734 (1968).
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concluded that a non-scrupled jury determining the guilt issue was
'prosecution prone" which denied him the right to impartiality.
Examining the defendant's argument the Court accepted the first
premise, for this was a demonstrable fact: the jury that considered
the guilt issue all favored the death penalty, because scrupled jurors
were challenged for cause. Furthermore, the conclusion that a jury
that is prosecution prone is unconstitutional, was also acceptable. But
was the conclusion proved by the defendant? Were non-scrupled jurors
highly dogmatic? And, did this make them prosecution prone? The
Supreme Court answered in the negative. The difficulty with the
argument rested in premises two and three, since the evidence pre-
sented in support of these premises was "too tentative and fragmentary
to establish that jurors not opposed to the death penalty tend to favor
the prosecution in the determination of guilt,"9' which would force
the Court to "speculate . . . as to the precise meaning of the terms
used in those studies. ' '9 2 But even though the Court declined to re-
verse the conviction, the constitutional ramifications of the "prosecu-
tion prone" concept were left unresolved for final determination at a
later date,93 indicating that the Court may have felt that there was
some merit to the defendant's contention and would have reversed the
conviction if more complete and compelling psychological evidence
had been presented. Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring, however, found
the available data sufficient to reverse the conviction. 94 The following
material is presented in order to test the validity of the defendant's
second and third premises.
Dogmatism, as discussed by Milton Rokeach9 5 and others,96 refers
to a way, or style of thinking; a total system of ideas and beliefs dis-
tinguished from rigidity, which points to difficulties in overcoming
single beliefs encountered in solving specific tasks; it relates to how
91. 88 S. Ct. at 1774.
92. Id. n.L.
93. Id. at 1775.
94. Id. at 1782.
95. M. ROKEACH, THE OPEN AND CLOSED MIND (Basic Books ed. 1969) [hereinafter
cited as ROKEACH].
96. E.g., Vacchiano et al., Structure of Dogmatism Scale, 20 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP'S
847-52 (1967); Korn, Scoring Methods and Construction Validity of the Dogmatism Scale,
24 EDUCATIONAL PSYCH. MEASUREMENT 867-74 (1964); Plant et al., Some Personality Dif-
ferences Between Dogmatic and Non Dogmatic Groups, 67 J. SOCIAL PSYCH. 67-75 (1965);
Vacchiano et al., Personality Correlations of Dogmatism, 32 J. CONSULTING CLINICAL
PSYCH. 83-85 (1968).
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one holds one's beliefs, and one's "total framework for understanding
his universe.
'97
As a result of extensive psychological testing, the dogmatism phe-
nomenon has recently been pinpointed and refined to a degree which
makes it susceptible to statistical measurement and evaluation.9" Psy-
chologists have developed a scale questionnaire to empirically measure
dogmatism on a continuum from highly dogmatic or closed-minded
(closed belief system), to less dogmatic or open-minded (open belief
system). The more dogmatic a subject is, the less capable he is in
evaluating information based on its own intrinsic merits;99 he is
increasingly subject to irrational inner forces; he cannot commiserate
with the feeling of others; 100 he is submissive, 1 1 conforming and needs
the support of others, more that those who are less dogmatic. The
typical highly dogmatic person is also found to be immature, impul-
sive, defensive, conventional, conservative 10 2 and stereotyped in his
thinking. On the other hand, low dogmatics possess opposite charac-
teristics-openness, independence, tolerance, etc.' 0 ,
The statements or items comprising the dogmatism questionnaire 0 4
were the product of research by Milton Rokeach of Michigan State
University'"5 and are commonly known as the Form E Dogmatism
Scale, also referred to by the psychological reports used by the peti-
tioner in Witherspoon.1°6 To develop the Scale, Rokeach initially began
with a larger group of statements he thought closed-minded people
would strongly a'gree with, while, it was assumed, open-minded indi-
viduals would strongly disagree with. 0 7 These statements were then
submitted by Rokeach to various samples including "left-of-center
groups (communists and religious non-believers) and . . . right-of-center
groups (Catholics) . . .""" who were expected to "score relatively high
on the Dogmatism Scale" because they generally clung to their respec-
tive belief systems in a tenacious fashion.io°
97. ROKEACH at 35.
98. Supra note 96.
99. ROKEACH at 57.
100. Supra note 96.
101. ROKEACH at 102.
102. Id. at 116-17.
103. C. F. Costin, Dogmatism and The Retention of Psychological Misconception, 28
EDUCATIONAL & PSYCH. MEASUREMENT 529.
104. See Appendix, infra.
105. ROKEACH at 71-91.
106. E.g., Brief of Rebecca B. Madden as Arnicus Curiae at 36, supra.
107. ROKEACH at 108.




The test is preceded by instructions, appearing in the Appendix,
which inform the subject that it is a study of his opinions and that there
are no right or wrong answers. Each subject is then told to respond to
each statement according to how much he agrees or disagrees with it.
Answers range from +3, I agree very much, to -3, 1 disagree very much.
Rokeach's initial results established a relationship between certain
statements and closed-minded characteristics. Thereafter, the Dogma-
tism Scale went through five revisions in which individual statements
found to have a low degree of correlation between a subject's response
and his open or closed belief system were deleted. According to
Rokeach, by the fifth revision (Form E), a significantly high degree of
reliability was achieved between the forty test statements and a subject's
dogmatism level. 110
In order to test the validity of the defendant's second premise, that
non-scrupled jurors were highly dogmatic, the Dogmatism Scale was
administered to 188 college students at Duquesne University in Novem-
ber, 1968. To relate the student's dogmatism level to his Position on the
death penalty (Group A, B, C, or D), an additional question, item 41 in
the Appendix, was added at the end of the Scale. '
By adding the value +4 as a constant to the +3 through -3 response
values indicated in the Form E instructions, infra, the following figures
were developed showing the relationship found, for the entire sample
and each sub-sample, between dogmatism' and the four Witherspoon
Positions as revealed by item 41, supra. On Figures 2 through 7, below,
the dotted line shows a theoretical significant relationship, the solid
line portrays the average dogmatism score for those students selecting
a particular Witherspoon Position in item 41. Furthermore, in Figure
8, each average dogmatism score for each Position was checked through
a "scatter plot" of the actual scores which demonstrated that the average
scores were not the result of unusually high or low scores.
The graphs below present the conclusion that no significant relation-
ship was found between one's dogmatism level and one's position on
110. The reliability of a statement was determined by noting the degree of consistency
of a person's scores from one half of the test to the other half, by repeating the test on
two separate occasions, or by taking two similar, not identical, forms of the test. Con-
sistency is typically expressed as a correlation ranging from 1.00 (perfect positive cor-
relation), to zero (no correlation), to -1.00 (perfect negative correlation). ROKEACH at 73.
The level of reliability for Form E ranged between .68 to .93.
111. As recommended by ROKEACH, the highest dogmatism score would be +4 added
to +3 as a response for all 40 items in the Dogmatism Test, or, +280. Conversely, the
lowest score indicative of an open mind would be [(+ 4) + (-3)] (40) = 40.
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D C B A
Witherspoon Position
D always opposed to the death sentence.
C opposed, but would consider death
sentence.
B in favor of the death sentence, but
would consider life imprisonment.
A would always impose the death sentence.
FIGURE 2. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOGMATISM AND POSITIONS ON THE
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FIGURE 3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOGMATISM AND POSITIONS ON THE













D C B A
Witherspoon Position
FIGURE 4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOGMATISM AND POSITIONS ON THE
DEATH PENALTY FOR THE PHILOSOPHY SUB-SAMPLE (N = 23)
capital punishment, as measured by item 41 for the entire sample or
any sub-sample. This is true even though there seems to be a slight
trend toward a higher dogmatic level when we move from response D
to response A, as seen most clearly in the Philosophy sample in Figure
4. But this trend cannot be considered statistically significant (i.e., that
a relationship exists that is not due to mere chance and probably will
occur again). Perhaps a more sensitive measurement (scale) of dogma-
tism would make the trend more meaningful as suggested by the theo-
retical line.
Finally, no particular statements within the scale itself, in the
sample or any sub-sample, were found to correlate significantly with
the four Witherspoon Positions, even after using the most liberal
significance levels for evaluation of correlation co-efficients.
But even if it can be shown by future psychological studies that non-
scrupled jurors are highly dogmatic (piemise (2)), the defendant's third
premise, that highly dogmatic jurors are "prosecution prone," must be
shown before one could conclude that a non-scrupled jury is "prosecu-
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FIGURE 5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOGMATISM AND POSITIONS ON THE








FIGURE 6. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOGMATISM AND POSITIONS ON THE






















FIGURE 7. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOGMATISM AND POSITIONS ON THE
DEATH PENALTY FOR THE BUSINESS NicHT SUB-SAMPLE (N = 55)
tion prone." Examining premise three in conjunction with the charac-
teristics of a dogmatic or closed-minded individual alone, it is difficult
to understand how a closed-minded individual is more often "prosecu-
tion prone" than not in determining guilt. The characteristics of the
closed-mind, discussed supra, in no way suggests a propensity toward
a guilty verdict. The only possible time the highly dogmatic individual
might be "prosecution prone" is when the defense argues against some-
thing the dogmatic believes in. And this does not have to be capital
punishment. Indeed, it is conceivable that both scrupled and non-
scrupled juries could be equally dogmatic in their feelings about capital
punishment.
Although these findings question the validity of the psychological
reports and the defendant's second and third premises in Witherspoon,
it would be premature, inappropriate and extremely unscientific to
extend the Duquesne Poll to the general population. One could, how-
ever, appropriately use the Duquesne Poll as an aid in the evaluation
of veniremen with college backgrounds.
Apart from the applicability of the Poll, the resolution of the ques-
tion of the role of dogmatism in jury selection can only effectively
be determined by an in-depth study covering a larger and more mean-
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ingful segment of the population, and perhaps by using a more sensitive
measuring instrument. Only then will it be known if the non-scrupled
juror is highly dogmatic, and the highly dogmatic individual is "prose-
cution prone." Until that time, however, the present report tends to
demonstrate the fallacy in accepting the petitioner's incomplete data
in Witherspoon to reverse any capital conviction made by a jury com-
prised solely of non-scrupled veniremen.
1 2
The possibility of creating standards or: factual pre-requisites for a
jury to find before imposing the death penalty
The Witherspoon Court held that excluding Group C from penalty
determinations in capital cases was inconsistant with the impartial jury
requirement applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Superficially this statement seems
innocuous, being only directed to the composition of the sentencing
jury. But considered together with other Supreme Court cases describ-
ing due process, the statement can be interpreted to inject the due
process concept into the procedure of selecting a particular penalty over
another in a capital case, rather than being limited to jury composition.
Through Witherspoon and other cases discussed below all present
penalty determinations may be unconstitutional as violative of the Due
Process Clause, since all determinations are now made without statutory
or judicial standards to assist the judge or jury in distinguishing why
one convicted defendant should die and another live. This procedure
results in a penalty determination that is completely arbitrary and un-
reviewable on appeal."
3
A dissenting opinion by Judge Gerald F. Flood of the Pennsylvania
Superior Court was the first appellate opinion to herald the application
of due process standards in penalty selections in Commonwealth v.
Giaccio"4 in 1963. In Giaccio the defendant was charged with wantonly
pointing and discharging a firearm in violation of the Penal Code." 5
The jury acquitted the defendant, but, according to the statute in-
volved, costs were imposed on the acquitted defendant subjecting him
112. But concurring Mr. Justice Douglas would have reversed the conviction because
the petitioner's psychological data tended to show that "some prejudice" did exist. In
this area, he wrote, no specific showing of prejudice was necessary. 88 S. Ct. at 1782.
The contrary finding in the Duquesne Dogmatism Poll may hinder further reasoning
in this direction.
113. In re Anderson, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21, 36, 447 P.2d 117 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
114. 202 Pa. Super. 294, 310, 196 A.2d 189, 197 (1963).
115. Id. at 297. PA. STAr. ANN. tit. 18, § 4716 (1939).
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to incarceration upon default of payment. 116 The sole reason given for
the jury's determination rested in the statutory rationale that the impo-
sition of costs was within the "discretion" of the jury. On appeal, Judge
Flood, dissenting, was persuaded by the defendant's argument that the
practice violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because the statute gave no guidelines as to why one defendant may
be penalized with costs and another not. Judge Flood found that this
result imposed a penalty in a vague, uncertain and indefinite manner
which would render any defense against imposing costs futile. "Against
what is he to defend?", queried Judge Flood.117 Affirmed on appeal to
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 118 the "acquitted" defendant appealed
to the United States Supreme Court 1 9 which reversed unanimously.
Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court, concluded that the Pennsyl-
vania penal statute was invalid under the Due Process Clause
because of vagueness and the absence of any standards sufficient to
enable defendants to protect themselves against arbitrary and
discriminatory impositions of costs ....
It is well established that a law fails to meet the requirements
of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that
it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or
leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed
standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular
case.... This 1860 Pennsylvania Act contains no standards at all,
nor does it place any conditions of any kind upon the jury's power
to impose costs upon a defendant who has been found by the jury
to be not guilty of a crime charged against him . . . . Certainly
one of the basic purposes of the Due Process Clause has always
been to protect a person against having the Government impose
burdens upon him except in accordance with the valid laws of
the land. Implicit in this constitutional safeguard is the premise
that the law must be one that carries an understandable meaning
with legal standards that courts must enforce. This Act as written
does not even begin to meet this constitutional requirement.
(Emphasis added, authorities omitted.) 
0
The Giaccio decision was the first to apply the due process "void for
vagueness" doctrine to a statutory penalty imposition. This becomes
clear when the two authorities cited for the Giaccio holding are ex-
116. Id.
117. 202 Pa. Super. 294, 315, 196 A.2d 189, 200 (1963).
118. 415 Pa. 139 (1964).
119. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
120. Id. at 402-03.
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amined, since neither involves a penalty issue. In Lanzetta v. State of
New Jersey121 a state penal statute, specifying the requisites for a guilt
determination of "gangsterism,"' 122 was determined to be "void for
vagueness" because the statutory definition of "gangsterism" was so
vague and indefinite that the application of the statute was rendered
uncertain, violating the fundamental right to know the exact prohibited
conduct. 23 In Baggett v. Bullitt 24 a similar due process doctrine known
as the "overbreath" doctrine was invoked to strike down a broad state
statute requiring teachers to swear that they were neither subversive
persons, nor members of a subversive organization. 125 The Supreme
Court found that the vague statutory language needlessly interfered
with the right of free speech when the same legitimate legislative pur-
pose could be achieved by a narrower and more specifically worded
statute.
Thus, Giaccio, through Lanzetta and Baggett extended the over-
lapping due process doctrines of "void for vagueness" and "overbreath"
to a penalty issue, whereas prior to Giaccio, such doctrines were used
only to control statutes regulating guilt determinations 20 and con-
duct. 2
7
In United States v. Jackson12 8 the Supreme Court again extended
due process application to the penalty issue. There, the penalty pro-
cedure of the Federal Kidnapping Act 1 specified that the death penalty
could be imposed only when the defendant pleaded not guilty and
requested a jury trial. Invoking the due process "overbreath doc-
121. 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
122. Any person not engaged in any lawful occupation, known to be a member
of any gang consisting of two or more persons, who has been convicted at least
three times of being a disorderly person, or who has been convicted of any crime,
in this or any other State, is declared to be a gangster.
N.J. REv. STAT. 2:136-5 (1937).
123. 306 U.S. at 619.
124. 377 US. 360 (1964).
125. "Subversive person" means any person who commits, attempts to commit, or
aids in the commission, or advocates, abets, advises or teaches by any means any
person to commit, attempt to commit, or aid in the commission of any act intended
to overthrow, destroy or alter, or to assist in the overthrow, destruction or alteration
of, the constitutional form of the government of the United States, or of the state
of Washington, or any political subdivision of either of them by revolution, force,
or violence....
WASH. REv. CODE § 9.81.010(5) (1955).
126. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963).
127. See Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 18 (1966); Cantwell v. State of Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 310 (1939).
128. 390 US. 570 (1968).
129. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1964).
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trine,"'30 this procedure was found to violate the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights by needlessly encouraging waiver of jury trials and
guilty pleas.' 81
The Witherspoon case applied the Due Process Clause to the penalty
issue even more vividly. There, the Court found that a sentence or
penalty determination by a non-scrupled or "hanging jury cannot be
squared with the Constitution. The State of Illinois has stacked the
deck against the petitioner. To execute this death sentence would de-
prive him of his life without due process of law." (Emphasis added,
footnotes omitted.)1 32 Furthermore, merely because the Due Process
Clause has not been used traditionally in the penalty issue "does not
mean that basic requirements of procedural fairness can be ignored
simply because the [penalty] determination differs .. .from the tradi-
tional assessment of whether the defendant engaged in a proscribed
course of conduct." (Emphasis added.)
133
Upon examination of this language together with the reasoning used
in previous cases leading to Witherspoon, it appears unlikely that the
present trend of applying due process to sentence determinations will
become dormant. Instead of limiting due process application to cost
impositions on acquitted defendants as in Giaccio, sole death determi-
nations by a jury as in Jackson, and the composition of a sentencing
jury as in Witherspoon, the next step can logically extend procedural
due process to the selection of one particular penalty over another, i.e.,
life imprisonment or death, by the jury because it is an unguided and
arbitrary determination.
The only present authority recognizing this due process extension is
the dissent in In re Anderson14 in which Justice Tobriner found that
although the California death penalty statute enumerated some fac-
tors' 35 for the jury to consider, the statute neither indicated which cir-
cumstances were mitigating nor which were aggravating, nor the extent
of aggravation or mitigation necessary to impose the death penalty.
Thus, the sentencing jury, unguided by any standard or factual pre-
requisites, has the "absolute discretion" to determine an arbitrary death
130. The Jackson Court relied upon two First Amendment cases using the "over
breath" doctrine. Shelton v. Tuker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258 (1967).
131. 390 U.S. at 583.
132. 88 S. Ct. at 1776.
133. Id.
134. 73 Cal. Rptr. 21, 36, 447 P.2d 117, 132 (1968).
135. Penalty evidence may be presented at trial "of the circumstances surrounding
the crime, of the defendant's background and history, and of any facts in aggravation or
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penalty selection, unreviewable on appeal on the question of abuse of
discretion. 3 6 The opinion ends without suggesting any standards itself.
The Model Penal Code 37 does, however, suggest proposed standards.
According to § 210.6 of the 1962 draft, the death penalty should only be
imposed by a jury if (1) the judge agrees, (2) one aggravating circum-
stance was found such as:
(a) The murder was committed by a convict under sentence of
imprisonment.
(c) At the time the murder was committed the defendant also com-
mitted another murder.
(d) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many
persons.
(f) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or pre-
venting a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from lawful custody.
(g) The murder was committed for pecuniary gain.
And, (3) no mitigating circumstance was found such as:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal
activity.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal
conduct or consented to the homicidal act.
(f) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of
another person.
(h) The youth of the defendant at the time of the crime.
The above quoted portion of the Model Penal Code may not be the
final word on which pre-requisites should or should not be considered,
but it is submitted that it effectively demonstrates what is meant by
the application of standards to penalty determinations, currently non-
existent in any criminal sentence determination.
mitigation of the penalty. The determination of the penalty of life imprisonment or
death shall be in the discretion of the court or jury trying the issue of fact on the evi-
dence presented." CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West 1955).
136. 73 Cal. Rptr. at 41, 447 P.2d at 137.
137. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1962).
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CONCLUSION
The direction of current decisions has increased the likelihood of
the following three developments:
(1) Future juries determining a particular sentence in criminal cases
may possibly be composed without regard to their views on the death
sentence. This conclusion is based on the findings in Witherspoon that
the exclusion from a jury of those who oppose the death penalty but
who could still impose it, was the exclusion of a significant group of
the community which denied the defendant's right to have a jury drawn
from a cross-section of that community; although it was also suggested
that the exclusion of those who would never impose the death penalty
constituted an insignificant group and was therefore still permissible.
The Duquesne Poll first of its kind and yet supported by other
studies, demonstrates that both groups may be significant. Upon con-
firmation of this finding, it is suggested that the continuing exclusion
of those who would never impose the death penalty denies the capital
defendant his right to have his sentence determined by a jury repre-
sentative of a cross-section of the community.
(2) Guilty verdicts in capital cases may be reversed if the jury was
composed of only those who favored the death penalty due to a newly
demonstrated bias prevalent in such people. This conclusion is founded
on the assumption that the future development of psychological testing
positively shows that those who favor the death penalty are biased in
favor of the prosecution. The present psychological tests are, however,
questionable in view of the Duquesne Poll which found that (a)
current psychological tests (i.e., the Dogmatism Scale).do not evaluate
one's tendency to be prosecution prone, and (b) even if they did mea-
sure the prosecution prone bias, no significant relationship was found
between dogmatism and one's view of capital punishment.
Conclusion (2) can find additional support in the analogous argu-
ment that excluding all those who oppose the death penalty from con-
sidering the issue of guilt in a capital case is a systematic arbitrary
exclusion of a certain group; this has already been held to be unconsti-
tutional (e.g., the exclusion of Negroes) even when no statistically sig-
nificant bias can be shown to have resulted. Furthermore, the exclusion
of those who disapprove of the death sentence should not be confused
with the proper exclusion from jury service of those who believe that a
particular unlawful act should not be legislatively sanctioned at all.
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To the contrary, those who oppose capital punishment do not disagree
with the law itself, but have made a choice of a particular penalty (life
imprisonment) which is a legally permitted decision.
(3) Another possibility is that once a man is found guilty of a capital
offence, he may only suffer capital punishment after the jury finds
certain factual pre-requisites with which the judge agrees. The con-
clusion rests on the proposition that an unguided sentence determina-
tion controlled only by the arbiter's "discretion" is contrary to due
process of law. Without the legislative or judicial establishment of these
factual pre-requisites, the judge or jury is guided only by its own sub-
jective feelings which a defendant cannot defend against, nor can the
appellate court review. This lack of guidance in determining different
penalties is extremely hazardous in cases where the guilty defendant is
the subject of community prejudice against his race, color, or creed.
It is hoped that these three developments be soberly considered by
both legislators and jurists together with the concept that a society in





The following is a study of what the general public thinks and feels
about a number of important social and personal questions. The best
answer to each statement below is your personal opinion. We have tried
to cover many different and opposing points of view; you may find
yourself agreeing strongly with some and perhaps uncertain about
others; whether you agree or disagree with any statement, you can be
sure that many people feel the same as you do.
Mark each statement in the space provided on the answer sheet ac-
cording to how much you agree or disagree with it. Please mark every
one. Write +1, +2, +3 or -1, -2, -3, depending on how you feel
in each case.
138. F. DosToEVSKII, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (Dutton ed. 1911).
* Extreme gratitude is extended to Dr. John South, Associate Professor of Behavioral
Science, whose advice and assistance was invaluable in computing and evaluating the
statistical data, and to Dr. Constance Fischer, Assistant Professor of Psychology, who
made herself available for consultation and suggested the use of ROKEACH's Dogmatism
Scale.
** Reprinted by permission from M. ROKEACH, THE OPEN AND CLOSED MIND, ID 1960
by Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, New York.
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±1: I agree a little -1: I disagree a little
+2: I agree on the whole -2: I disagree on the whole
+3: I agree very much -3: I disagree very much
1. The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common.
2. The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest
form of democracy is a government run by those who are most
intelligent.
3. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal,
it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain
political groups.
4. It is only natural that a person would have a much better ac-
quaintance with ideas he believes in than with ideas he opposes.
5. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.
6. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome place.
7. Most people just don't give a "damn" for others.
8. I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve
my personal problems.
9. It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future.
10. There is so much to be done and so little time to do it in.
11. Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just can't stop.
12. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several
times to make sure I am being understood.
13. In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed in what I
am going to say that I forget to listen to what the others are saying.
14. It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward.
15. While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition
is to become a great man, like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shake-
speare.
16. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something
important.
17. If given the chance, I would do something of great benefit to the
world.
18. In the history of mankind there have probably been just a handful
of really great thinkers.
19. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the
things they stand for.
20. A man who does not believe in some great cause has not really
lived.
21. It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that
life becomes meaningful.
22. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is
probably only one which is correct.
23. A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is likely to
be a pretty "wishy-washy" sort of person.
24. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because
it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.
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25. When it comes to difference of opinion in religion we must be
careful not to compromise with those who believe differently from
the way we do.
26. In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish if he considers
primarily his own happiness.
27. The worst crime a person could commit is to attack publicly the
people who believe in the same thing he does.
28. In times like these it is often necessary to be more on guard against
ideas put out by people or groups in one's own camp than by those
in the opposing camp.
29. A group which tolerates too much differences of opinion among its
own members cannot exist for long.
30. There are two kinds of people in this world: Those who are for the
truth and those who are against the truth.
31. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit
he's wrong.
32. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is beneath
contempt.
33. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the
paper they are printed on.
34. In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what's
going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.
35. It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what is going on
until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one re-
spects.
36. In the long run the best way to live is to pick friends and associates
whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own.
37. The present is often all too full of unhappiness. It is only the
future that counts.
38. If a man accomplishes his mission in life it is sometimes necessary
to gamble "all or nothing at all."
39. Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed
important social and moral problems don't really understand what
is going on.
40. Most people just don't know what's good for them.
Please answer the following question by circling the corresponding
letter on your answer sheet.
41. A legally sane man is accused of murder, punishable by death.
If you were questioned as a potential juror, which of the following
positions would be most like your own? (Circle one letter on the
answer sheet.)
If the man was found guilty of murder,
A. I would definitely agree with the imposition of the death
penalty.
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B. I would probably agree with the imposition of the death
penalty, but under certain circumstances I would consider a
"life sentence."
C. I would probably be opposed to imposition of the death
penalty, but under certain circumstances I would consider it.
D. I would definitely disagree with the imposition of the death
penalty.
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